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Recent Developments 
Wholey v. Sears Roebuck: 
Terminating Employees for Reporting Suspected Criminal Activity to the 
Appropriate Authorities Constitutes Wrongful Discharge 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
terminating employees for reporting 
suspected criminal activity to the 
appropriate authorities constitutes 
wrongful discharge. Wholey v. 
Sears, 370 Md. 38, 803 A.2d 482 
(2002). In so holding, the court 
refused Wholey's invitation to adopt 
an all-encompassing public policy 
mandate for investigating and 
reporting criminal activity, stating 
that changing the law in such a way 
is a task better suited for the 
Legislature. Wholey, 370 Md. 38, 
70, 803 A.2d 482, 501. 
Beginning in February 1972, 
Edward L. Wholey ("Wholey") 
worked as a security officer for 
Sears, Roebuck and Co. ("Sears") 
at its store in Glen Burnie, 
Maryland. His duties included 
investigating and reporting thefts by 
both employees and customers. 
In March of 1995, Wholey 
observed the manager of the store 
in Glen Burnie taking items into his 
personal office from the store floor. 
The items would then disappear 
from his office. After this happened 
several times, Wholey reported this 
behavior to his superior, John 
Eiseman ("Eiseman"), who told him 
to "maintain his scrutiny." As this 
type of activity continued, Wholey 
again informed Eiseman and was 
given the use of a surveillance van 
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to observe the manager outside of 
the store and permission to install a 
camera. Later that day, he informed 
Eiseman the camera was installed 
and suggested that Eiseman inform 
the District Store Manager about it. 
Shortly thereafter, he was ordered 
to remove the camera. 
On February 6, 1996, Sears 
fired Wholey from his j ob because 
his superiors did not like his "cop 
mentality" or the way he handled the 
situation with the manager. In 
September, Wholey filed a 
complaint in Anne Arundel County 
against Sears and Eiseman, alleging 
wrongful discharge and defamation. 
With respect to the wrongful 
discharge and defamation claims, 
the jury found for the defendants. 
The jury returned a verdict for 
Wholey on the wrongful discharge 
claim and for Sears on the 
defamation claim. Sears appealed 
the wrongful discharge judgment to 
the court of special appeals, which 
reversed, holding, as a matter oflaw, 
Sears did not violate public policy 
by terminating Wholey. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to consider whether a 
public policy mandate exists in 
Maryland to ensure that an at-will 
employee will not be terminated for 
investigating and reporting 
suspected criminal activity. 
The court began its discussion 
by defining an at-will employee, 
such as Wholey, as one who has 
"an employment contract of infinite 
duration which is terminable for any 
reason by either party." Id. at 48, 
803 A.2d at 487. One exception 
to this rule is the tort of wrongful 
discharge. Wholey, 370 Md. 38, 
48, 803 A.2d 482, 487. In the 
case of Adler v. Am. Standard 
Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 
464, 467 (1981), the court held that 
even an at-will employee may 
maintain a cause of action for 
wrongful termination for public 
policy reasons. Id. Therefore, to 
establish a wrongful discharge, the 
basis for the discharge must violate 
a "clear mandate of public policy" 
and there must be a connection 
between the conduct of the 
employee and the reason for which 
he was fired. Id. at 50-51, 803 
A.2d at 489. 
The court discussed two 
limiting factors with respect to 
adopting new public policy 
mandates. Id. at 52, 803 A.2d at 
490. The first is to "provide a 
remedy for an otherwise unre-
medied violation of public policy." 
Id. Second, public policy should 
be distinguishable from statutory 
and constitutional mandates. Id. at 
52, 803 A.2d at 490. The court 
did not limit itself strictly to prior 
judicial opinions, legislative en-
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actments, or administrative regu-
lations in determining public policy. 
Wholey, 370 Md. 38, 54, 803 A.2d 
482, 491. However, it did recognize 
that declaration of public policy is 
usually a function of the Legislature. 
Id. After discussing what defines 
the public policy mandate under 
which a wrongful discharge claim 
may be pursued, the court 
concluded that such a public policy 
mandate for the wrongful discharge 
of at-will employees does exist, 
however, Wholey was ineligible. Id. 
at 57, 803 A.2d at 492. 
A wrongful discharge tort 
exists for at-will employees for two 
reasons. Id. First, the Legislature 
has refused to provide a statutory 
remedy for private employees who 
report criminal activity. Id Second, 
under Md. Code, Art. 27, § 7 62, the 
Criminal Law Article, the Legi-
slature created a misdemeanor 
offense for one who retaliates 
against a person who reports a 
crime. Wholey, 370 Md. 38, 57, 
803 A.2d 482, 492. 
To fall into the category of 
persons who qualify for this public 
policy exception to at-will 
employment, the employee must 
report the suspected activity to 
appropriate law enforcement or 
judicial officials. Id. at 62, 803 A.2d 
at 496. Simply investigating the 
suspected activity and reporting it 
to co-employees or supervisors did 
not put Wholey into that category. 
Id. 
Wholey cannot argue that he 
was acting in the "public good" by 
investigating the criminal activity. Id 
at 65,803 A.2d at 498. The court 
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held the "public good" is best 
served by reporting criminal activity, 
not merely investigating it. Id. This 
holding is justified by the fact that 
the Legislature has declined to hold 
citizens criminally responsible for 
failing to investigate or report 
criminal activity. Wholey, 370 Md. 
38, 65, 803 A.2d 482, 498. The 
court simply refused to create a 
blanket exception to the notion of 
at-will employment, which would 
state ,that investigating criminal 
activity is a "per se public benefit, 
the termination for which, is 
actionable in tort law." Id. at 67, 
803 A.2d at 499. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryalnd did not hold there is a 
legal duty to report criminal activity 
in Maryland. Id. at 70, 803 A.2d 
at 500-501. However, should one 
decide to report criminal activity to 
the appropriate authorities, the 
Legislature determined that they 
should be protected from retaliation 
for public policy reasons. Id. It is 
not fair to punish a person for 
reporting criminal activity, Wholey, 
370 Md. 38, 59, 803 A.2d 482, 
494, but in order to qualify for this 
protection, the criminal activity must 
be reported to the appropriate 
authorities. Id. at 62, 803 A.2d at 
496. Therefore, while a public 
policy mandate exists for those 
employees that report criminal 
activity, Wholey was not entitled to 
the protection because he did not 
report this activity to the appropriate 
authorities. Id. at 70, 803 A.2d at 
500-501. 
Following the decision in this 
case, the court did not purport to 
create a blanket provision that 
allows a public policy exception to 
the at-will employment doctrine in 
all circumstances. This case demon-
strates that the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland respects the concept of 
separation of powers by its 
recognition that a court's task is to 
interpret the law and not to create 
or change it. Holding that such an 
all-encompassing provision exists 
would, in effect, be creating law, 
which is a function of the Legislature, 
not the court of appeals. 
